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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

JEFFERY RUSSELL FINLAYSON,

:

Case No. 20020339-SC

Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
This brief has two parts. The first is a response to the State's cross-petition on the
issue of whether the sentencing court had jurisdiction to re-sentence Mr. Finlayson after
this Court modified his conviction. The second part is a reply to the State's response to
Mr. Finlayson's argument that errors in the pre-sentence investigation report tainted the
sentencing.1

1

The posture of this appeal is slightly unusual. Originally, Mr. Finlayson petitioned this
Court for a review of the Court of Appeals' opinion on two issues: 1) its ruling that the trial court
"may not have had jurisdiction to re-sentence" Mr. Finlayson, and 2) its ruling that the mistakes
in the pre-sentence investigation report do not justify a remand of this case or a vacation of the
sentence with a remand. State v. Finlayson. 2002 UT App 36. Mr. Finlayson outlined problems
with these rulings and requested a review of both. Pet. for Writ of Cert. 10-17.
Then, the State cross-petitioned only on the jurisdictional issue. Condit. Cross-Pet. for
Writ of Cert. 1.
This Court granted both the petition and cross-petition. Pet. Add. D.
Accordingly, Mr. Finlayson filed an opening brief and presented arguments on both the
jurisdiction and pre-sentence investigation report issues. Pet. 11-20. The State responded to Mr.

The first part, which is the response to the State's cross-petition }ssue, shows that
the trial court had jurisdiction to re-sentence Mr. Finlayson after this Cdurt reversed one
count of his three-count conviction.2 This is because changing part of a onviction
warrants re-evaluation of the sentence as a whole, and the trial court had to re-evaluate
the sentence in light of this Court's holding. Furthermore, the State has cited no authority
to the contrary, and has no basis for its argument that the trial court lackpd jurisdiction.
And so, the trial court's re-sentencing was proper.
The second part of this argument, which is the reply to the State' response to Mr.
Finlayson's petition issues, demonstrates that the most appropriate remedy in this case is
a vacation of the sentence, a remand for correction of the pre-sentence iitvestigation
report, and re-sentencing. This is because due process requires re-senten^ing where the
trial court relied on an inaccurate pre-sentence investigation report and did not disclaim

Finlayson's arguments on both issues in a red brief entitled "Brief of Cross-Peiitioner and
Respondent on Certiorari Review." Cross-Pet. 8-18.
At this point, the rules technically require a response to the cross-petition issue, which is
the jurisdiction issue, and a reply to the State's response on the petition issues, which are the
jurisdiction and pre-sentence investigation report issues. Utah R.App. 51(b) (2002). However,
because the jurisdiction issue is both a petition and cross-petition issue, and because it was
thoroughly briefed in Mr. Finlayson's opening brief, the response portion to the State's crossappeal more closely resembles a reply brief. There is no statement of the issue standard of
review section, or other such information typical of a response brief. Also, discission is limited
to a response to the State's arguments. This is appropriate to avoid needless repetition. See Utah
R.App. 24(c) (2002) ("The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if
the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering
any new matter set forth in the opposing brief.")
2

This Court reversed his aggravated kidnaping conviction in State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT
10, Kl, 994 P.2d 1243.
2

reliance on the inaccuracies. This is explained in United States Supreme Court and Tenth
Circuit cases.3 It is also apparent from this Court's opinions in State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d
1064 (Utah 1993)4 and State v. Veteto. 2000 UT 62, 6 P.3d 1133. Here, the trial court did
not disclaim reliance on the inaccurate portions of the report, and so vacation of the
sentence and remand for error correction and re-sentencing is the appropriate remedy.

ARGUMENTS
I. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS. THE TRIAL COURT
HAD JURISDICTION TO RE-SENTENCE M R FINLAYSON. AND THIS
COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL
The State's argument that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to re-sentence
Mr. Finlayson after this Court reversed one count of his three-count conviction is
unreasonable and is not supported by authority.
First, the argument is unreasonable because the modification of a conviction
warrants re-evaluation of the sentence as a whole.5 This is basic.6 Modification of the
3

Gardner v.Florida. 430 U.S. 349, 351 (1977); United States v. Peterman. 841 F.2d
1474, 1483 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gattas. 862 F.2d 1432, 1435 (10th Cir. 1988).
4

This case was superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Hammond. 2001 UT 92,
34P.3d773.
5

See United States v. Pimienta-Redondo. 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989) ("When the
conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, common sense dictates that the
judge should be free to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan, and to
reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon remand, within applicable constitutional and
statutory limits, if that appears necessary in order to ensure that the punishment stillfitsboth
crime and criminal."); United States v. Bentlev. 850 F.2d 327, 328 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Our court
has concluded that whenever a reversal on appeal undoes a sentencing plan, or even calls the
plan into question, the district court should be invited to re-sentence the defendant on all counts
3

number and severity of counts in a conviction may affect the sentences imposed for each
individual count. It may also affect whether multi-count sentences run consecutively or
concurrently.7 It affects the prison-time matrix. And, it may affect the aggravating and
mitigating factors considered during sentencing.8 All of this should be re| examined and
applied in a re-sentencing after the modification of a conviction.
Further, this Court's omission of the word "remand" in its reversal of one count of
Mr. Finlayson's three-count conviction9 does not absolve the trial court 6f its duty to
carry out this Court's order. The trial court still had a duty to re-evaluate Mr. Finlayson's

in order to achieve a rational, coherent structure in light of the remaining convictions.")
6

The wisdom of re-evaluation after an appellate modification pervades legal practice,
For instance, when part of a statute is held unconstitutional, the effect on the statute as a whole
must be evaluated. State v. Lopes. 980 P.2d 191,196-97 (Utah 1999). Also,ifi part <
of a property
deed is invalid, it may affect the owners' rights of ownership. Julian v. Peterseii , 966 P.2d 878,
881-82 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Likewise, if a sales contract is not integrated, thip may effect the
contractual provisions as a whole. Spears v. Warr. 2002 UT 24, ^[19,44 P.3d 7 2. An invalid
"Release of Liability" clause in a contract affects the parties' liabilities as a whble. Ong Int'L
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447,453-54 (Utah 1993). These are only a few examples of
why changing part of an original plan requires re-evaluation of the plan as a whole
7

State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188, 191-92 (Utah 1990). See Utah Code Ahn. § 76-3201(l)(b) & (4)(a) (Supp. 2002) (allowing the sentencing court to take into consideration other
crimes of which the defendant was convicted, along with "any criminal conduci" admitted by the
defendant, in imposing restitution); Utah Sentencing Commission, Adult Sentencing and Release
Guidelines 2, 5, 7-12 (1998) (offender sentenced according to all charges supporting conviction;
offender sentenced in accordance with his or her "overall culpability based on ihe nature of the
current offense[s]"; severity of the offenses key in determining enhancement of sentences;
criminal history including current offenses considered in sentencing; percentage of sentence
served is determined by the length of the sentence for each charge; and intermediate sanctions
such as probation imposed according to number and nature of charges).
8

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (6) (Supp. 2002).

9

See State v. Finlavson. 2000 UT 10, ^ 35-36, 994 P.2d 1243 (omittinglthe term
"remand.")
4

sentence in light of this Court's opinion and re-sentence him. After all, lower courts
"must implement both the letter and the spirit of the [appellate court's] mandate, taking
into account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces." Thurston v.
Box Elder County. 892 P.2d 1034,1038 (Utah 1995).
In short, after this Court reversed Mr. Finlayson's aggravated kidnaping charge,11
it was both reasonable and appropriate for the trial court to re-visit his imposed
punishment, and re-sentence him on the remaining charges. To do otherwise would have
been to ignore the effect of this Court's modification of his conviction and, in essence,
fail to carry out this Court's judgment on the matter.
What is more, the State's position that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
re-sentence Mr. Finlayson is completely unsupported by authority. None of the State's
cited cases are directly on point or even helpfully analogous.
The State discusses only two cases in depth and neither of them apply here. The
first case, Frost v. District Court, did not involve an appellate court's partial reversal or
modification of the district court's judgment. It simply held that the trial court did not
have authority to modify its own judgment in a water rights case where no appeal had
been taken and the original judgement was not incorrect. Frost v. District Court. 83 P.2d
737, 740 (Utah 1938). That is not what happened here. The trial court did not, upon its

10

See Utah R.App. 30(b) (2002) ("If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial
shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other order
is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be executed.")
11

Finlavson. 2000 UT 10,1J1.
5

own initiative, re-open a case and alter its own correct judgment. Here, this Court
reversed one count of Mr. Finlayson's three-count conviction,12 and re- bentencing took
place in light of that reversal. And so, Frost doesn't apply.
The other case discussed by the State is Peters v. Peters, on whidh the State relies
for the principle that an appeal from a trial court's decision ends the trial court's
jurisdiction over the matter appealed. Cross-Pet. 10. In that case, this Cpurt had to decide
whether the trial court's temporary award of alimony and attorney's fe^s during an appeal
of its judgment in a divorce action was grounded in jurisdiction. Peters \y. Peters, 394 P.2d
71, 72-73 (Utah 1964). This Court decided it was. l± But that holding c]ioes not apply
here. This case doesn't involve a ruling that the trial court made during an appeal. It
involves a trial court's re-sentencing of a criminal defendant after part of his conviction
was reversed by this Court. Pet. 2. So, Peters is of little use here.
None of the other cases cited by the State are relevant to the issub at hand. Some
cases cited by the State, including Saunders v. Sharp, Clark v. State, an$ State v. Grant,
are irrelevant because, like Peters v. Peters, they involved district court |rulings made
while appeals were in progress.13 Another case cited by the State, State ]y. Montoya, is not

12

Fmlayson, 2000 UT 10,1|1

13

Clark v. State. 727 N.E.2d 18, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); State v. GraJit, 614 N.W.2d
848, 851-52 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000); Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 577 (Utih Ct. App. 1991).
In Clark v. State the defendant was convicted of a crime and placed 01^ probation. Clark,
727 N.E.2d at 19. He appealed. Id While the appeal was in progress, the trial court received
notice of three probation violations, and it held a hearing on the violations. Id Following the
hearing, the court revoked the defendant's probation and imposed the suspen4ed sentence. Id.
6

on point because, like Frost v. District Court, it involved the correction of a sentence that
was already correct,14 not re-sentencing in light of a partial reversal of a conviction, as we
have here.
Other cases are not relevant because they concern laws or circumstances that do
not apply here. For instance, the State quotes Schoney v. Mem'l Estates, Inc., a civil case,
as saying "'[a]n affirmance is the confirmation and ratification by an appellate court of a
judgment, order, or decree of a lower court"' and is not the same as "'a remand.5" CrossPet. 10 (quoting Schonev v. Mem'l Estates. Inc.. 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah App. 1993)). In
Schoney a civil lawsuit ended after default judgment was entered against the plaintiff.
Schoney, 863 P.2d at 60. This judgment was affirmed by this Court. Id But then, the
plaintiff attempted to reinstate the litigation by filing a new motion in the trial court. On

Later, the conviction was affirmed by the appellate court. Id On appeal once again, the Indiana
Court of Appeals supported the trial court's action, noting that, although the trial court generally
loses jurisdiction once an appeal is perfected, it retains collateral jurisdiction over matters such
as probation violation. Li at 20.
In State v. Grant, the defendant filed a motion to suppress prior to trial, but the judge did
not ever rule on the motion. Grant, 614 N.W.2d at 851-52. The defendant was convicted and
appealed. Id. at 852. After the appeal was filed, the appellate counsel filed a motion in the trial
court seeking a ruling on the motion to suppress. Id. In response, the court entered a ruling
denying the motion to suppress. Id, However, the Iowa Court of Appeals did not consider this
ruling, noting that "a district court loses jurisdiction over the merits of a controversy once the
notice of appeal is perfected." Id.
In Saunders v. Sharp, the trial court awarded post-judgment attorney's fees to one party
while an appeal was in progress. Saunders, 818 P.2d at 575-76. This Court later affirmed the
award, holding that, while a trial court generally loses jurisdiction with regard to matters
appealed, it retains collateral jurisdiction. Id. at 577-78. The award of attorneys fees is a
collateral matter over which the trial court retained jurisdiction. Id. at 578.
14

State v. Montova. 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
7

appeal again, this Court held that the case was over and that no remand ^ad facilitated the
plaintiffs filing of a motion. Id. at 61.
Schoney is not relevant here. This is not a civil case nor does it irivolve a default
judgment. Indeed, this Court did not even summarily affirm Mr. Finlayspn's conviction.
Here, this Court partially reversed Mr. Finlayson's conviction and remitted the case.
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,1fl. Re-sentencing was required so that this Coujrfs judgment
could be executed. And so, Schoney does not apply.
Finally, Lopez v. State is not on point. In that case, the Texas Coiirt of Criminal
Appeals interpreted a Texas statute to mean that a new trial awarded to a defendant
because of an error made during the punishment stage trial gave the trial court jurisdiction
only to hold further punishment proceedings. Lopez v. State. 18 S.W.3d|1637,639-40
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). It did not give the court jurisdiction over guilt--innocence
matters. Id. at 639. But no such statute is involved here, and even if it was, this Court did
not find a mere sentencing error. This Court actually reversed one of Mij. Finlayson's
criminal convictions, necessitating a re-sentencing. Finlayson. 2000 UT 10,U1. And so,
Lopez is not persuasive.
In short, the State's argument that Mr. Finlayson should not havelbeen resentenced after this Court reversed one count of his three-count conviction is not
reasonable or supported by case law. Indeed, re-sentencing was appropriate to re-evaluate
the sentence in light of this Court's holdings and to carry out the judgment of this Court.
And so, the jurisdiction of the trial court to re-sentence should be affirmed
8

II. A VACATION OF THE SENTENCE AND REMAND FOR FINDINGS
AND RE-SENTENCING, RATHER THAN A SIMPLE REMAND. IS
APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE
Contrary to the State's argument, a vacation of the sentence and remand for resentencing is necessary because the trial court's reliance upon the inaccurate pre-sentence
investigation report may have affected the sentence. The court did not make oral or
written statements saying that it was not relying upon the inaccurate portions of the
report. Nor did it explain the extent of its general reliance upon the report. R. 1071 [5,14,
18]. In these circumstances, the court's reliance may have affected the sentence. And so,
the most appropriate remedy is a vacation of the sentence, a remand to resolve the errors,
and re-sentencing in light of those findings.
This remedy is compelled by case law, especially federal case law. Importantly,
the United States Supreme Court has strongly implied that the due process clause of the
federal constitution compels re-sentencing whenever the trial court relies on faulty
information from a pre-sentence investigation report in sentencing.15 This imputation has
usually come in the context of death sentences, but it is nevertheless useful here. One
case, Gardner v. Florida, is particularly enlightening. In Gardner the Court held, in a
divided opinion,16 that because the trial court had relied on information from a

15

Gardner v.Florida. 430 U.S. 349, 351 (1977).

16

In Gardner three justices joined in the lead opinion, a fourth concurred without a
written opinion, afifthtook the view that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment was violated by the use of secret information in imposing the death penalty, and a
sixth concurred in the judgment while relying upon other case law. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 351,
362-64.
9

confidential portion of the pre-sentence investigation report, the conviction must be
vacated, the confidential portion added to the record, and the defendant re-sentenced in
light of the information. Gardner. 430 U.S. at 360-62. This remedy was appropriate to
ensure that the sentencing was characterized by sound information and identifiable
influences:
it is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself,, must
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Even though the
defendant has no substantive right to a particular sentence within the range
authorized by statute, the sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal
proceeding . . . . The defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of
the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he may
have no right to object to a particular result of the sentencing process
Gardner. 430 U.S. at 358 (citations omitted). From this, it follows that, when the quality
of information used in sentencing is inadequate, a vacation of the sentence and remand
for re-sentencing is required. Id. at 362.
The Tenth Circuit has provided even further guidance. In United States v.
Peterman, the Tenth Circuit specifically held that, whenever the record does not
document the extent of the trial court's reliance upon unreliable informalion, the sentence
must be vacated and the case remanded for re-sentencing. United States y. Peterman, 841
F.2d 1474, 1483 (10th Cir. 1988). Of course, federal courts such as the T^nth Circuit are
not guided by section 77-18-l(6)(a) of the Utah Code, as we are here Biiit they rely on a
very similar federal rule.17 And, courts have interpreted this rule to require re-sentencing
17

Compare Fed. R.Crim. 32(c)(3)(d) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6J(a) (Supp. 2002).

The federal rule reads:
10

whenever the trial court does not document the extent of its reliance upon unreliable
information. Peterman, 841 F.2d at 1483-84. This documentation does not have to be
extensive. IdL But it must be more than simply ignoring the errors, as occurred in this
case. R. 1071 [5]. This remedial guideline has now become well-entrenched in the Tenth

If the comments of the defendant and his counsel or testimony or other
information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence
investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court shall,
as to each matter controverted, make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a
determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted
will not be taken into account in sentencing. A written record of such findings and
determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence
investigation report thereafter made available to the Bureau of Prisons or the
Parole Commission.
Peterman, 841 F.2d at 1482-83 (quoting the rule). Notably, since Peterman and Gattas this rule
has been amended and renumbered, but this does not appear to have affected the principle that
concerns us here. See Fed. R.Crim. 32(c)(1) (2002) ("At the sentencing hearing, the court...
must rule on any unresolved objections to the presentence report. The court may, in its
discretion, permit the parties to introduce testimony or other evidence on the objections. For
each matter controverted, the court must make either a finding on the allegation or a
determination that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into
account in, or will not affect, sentencing. A written record of these findings and determinations
must be appended to any copy of the presentence report made available to the Bureau of
Prisons.")
The Utah statute reads:
The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been
resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to
the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten
working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the
department. If after ten workings days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the
court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (Supp. 2002).
11

Circuit. United States v. Gattas. 862 F.2d 1432, 1435 (10th Cir. 1988).
Here, the trial court did not document the extent of its reliance oii inaccuracies in
the pre-sentence investigation report, or even its reliance on the report iih general. The
court did not even comment orally on whether it was relying on the inaccurate portions of
the report. R. 1071 [5]. Instead, the court brushed aside concerns about ^he report's
inaccuracies and continued with the proceeding. IcL The court generally relied upon the
report in sentencing,18 but it never addressed the defense counsel's concerns about
inaccuracies in the report. In these circumstances, the sentence should be vacated and this
case should be remanded for resolution of the inaccuracies and re-sentencing.
The State contends that there is no Utah authority supporting this course of action.
Cross-Pet. 15. However, the State is wrong. Both State v. Johnson and State v. Veteto
support a vacation of the sentence, a remand for resolution of the errors (in the presentence investigation report, and re-sentencing in this case.
In Johnson the pre-sentence investigation report inappropriately Contained multilevel hearsay about a crime involving a third-party victim.19 The trial cojirt used this

18

R. 1071 [5, 14,18]. The State contends that the judge who sentenced Mr. Finlayson
was the same judge who had conducted trial, and he did not need to rely on the pre-sentence
investigation report. Cross-Pet. 16. However, the trial occurred August 29th and 30th, 1995, five
years before the sentencing at issue, R. 206, 407, 616, 829, and it is unlikely that the judge could
have recalled all aspects of the case without reviewing the record or pre-sentence investigation
report. Also, the court indicated that it had reviewed the case, R. 1071 [5], ancj referred to the
report twice during sentencing. Id at 14, 18.
19

State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) (superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in State v. Harmmond. 2001 UT 92, 34 P.3d 7731).
12

report in pronouncing sentence. Id. Upon review, this Court held that multi-level hearsay
is inappropriate in a pre-sentence investigation report, and vacated the sentence and
remanded for correction of the report and re-sentencing. Id. at 1074-75. Then, in Veteto,
this Court found that the trial court had failed to resolve alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report. State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, ^15, 6 P.3d 1133. This Court
remanded the case for resolution of the inaccuracies, and indicated that if the findings
necessitated further proceedings, presumably factual hearings or re-sentencing, these
proceedings should be conducted:
we remand to the trial court with instructions that it expressly resolve
defendant's objections in full compliance with section 77-18-l(6)(a) by
entering the required findings on the record. The court may hold an
additional hearing if required by the circumstances, or simply enter the
necessary findings upon the record where the contested issues were
presented to the court and considered at the sentencing hearing.
Id, And so, both Johnson and Veteto support a vacation of the sentence, remand for
correction, and re-sentencing in this case.
Finally, although a vacation of the sentence and remand for re-sentencing is
appropriate, Mr. Finlayson requests that, in the event a vacation is not granted, a remand
for relevant findings be issued. These findings are necessary to prevent the report's errors
from affecting future proceedings before the Board of Pardons and Parole or other
courts.20 Correcting the errors would also accomplish the statutory purpose of providing
20

As the Tenth Circuit has noted, errors in the pre-sentence investigation report should be
corrected because the report affects an inmate throughout his term of incarceration and
throughout his life:
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the Board with accurate information from which to assess the defendant s progress in
prison and on parole. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(3), (4) & (5) (Supp. 2002). Nonetheless,
a vacation of the sentence and re-sentencing is preferable in this case to ensure that
accurate information is used in sentencing.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Finlayson respectfully requests a vacation of his sentence
with a remand to the sentencing court for appropriate findings and re-sentencing.
Alternatively, Mr. Finlayson requests a remand for findings in accordance with section
77-18-l(6)(a) of the Utah Code.

Although the requirement in the second part of Rule 32(c)(3)(D) [of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure] that the sentencing court attach a record of its
resolution of contested matters concerning the presentence report is ministerial in
nature, we believe that the requirement is a significant enough part of the
sentencing process to support an action under Section 2255. The Advisory
Committee's comments to Rule 32(c)(3)(D) recognize that "the Bureau of Prisons
and Parole Commission make substantial use of the presentence report" 97
F.R.D. 245, 308. In fact, after a defendant is sentenced, the presentence report
becomes "the central document in the correctional process." Fennal & Hall, Due
Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of
Presentence Reports in Federal Courts. 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1613,1628 (1980). For
example, the report may have an important influence on a defendant's
classification in a prison, his ability to obtain furloughs, the treatment programs
provided to him, and his parole determinations. Id. at 1679-80. Thus, transmission
of an accurate presentence report, which includes a written record of the
sentencing judge's resolution of contested matters in the report, is vitally
important to the post-sentencing lives of criminal defendants.
Gattas, 862 F.2d at 1434.
14
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